I’ve often said that cities should calculate what sports teams are actually worth to them before writing a blank check for a stadium or arena — you know, like Naheed Nenshi has tried to do in Calgary — so when Andrew Dunn, editor-in-chief of something called the Charlotte Agenda (“Charlotte Agenda exists to make Charlotte the smartest, most human city in the world”! Also: “We believe in drinking beer at work”!), set out to do just that today for a Carolina Panthers stadium deal, gotta give him at least some props, right? Let’s see how he did:
- “Economists generally agree that the costs to taxpayers outweigh the benefits of all the additional spending on construction, hotels, restaurants, tickets and concessions.” He can read! Good start!
- Notes that Charlotte paid $87.5 million in 2013 for a six-year lease extension for the Panthers, which means “the going rate is at least $13.75 million per year to make a team stay put.” He doesn’t note that that was one of the worst returns on a stadium subsidy in history, so maybe his reading doesn’t extend to this site.
- “I believe that the Panthers are worth public money.” That’s kind of assuming your conclusion there, but in case he means “something, even if it’s only a penny,” I’ll allow it.
- “I’ll grant that Charlotte’s government will never be able to directly recoup in employment and sales taxes the money it puts toward the Panthers. But putting public money toward pro sports shouldn’t be analyzed that way. Think of it more as a marker of what kind of city we want Charlotte to be.” Followed by an assertion that the Hornets and Panthers “put the Charlotte name in the national consciousness and touched off a business boom,” his sole presented evidence being a 1994 Chicago Tribune article in which a Hornets season-ticket holder says that the teams put Charlotte on the map.
- “An investment in the Panthers is not using the same money that would build affordable housing.” This because the city could use hotel and rental car tax money that is earmarked for promoting tourism, notwithstanding that if general fund revenue ends up being used on a tourism project because the hotel and rental car tax fund is all spent on a football stadium, it’s absolutely taking away from money for things like affordable housing.
- “Let’s figure out what we’re willing to do before a new ownership group gets involved. They’ll buy the team knowing what support they can count on from the community.” I.e., let’s make an offer before we’ve even been asked for anything. Where figuring out what a team’s presence is worth to a city (and, just as important, whether it has any better options for leaving if you don’t lavish its owners with cash) is a great preparatory step for negotiations, up and telling new team owners, “Hey, we have a check this big waiting for you!” is a terrible, terrible idea. What were we just saying about bidding against yourself?
- “Perhaps both sides will come out in the black.” Uhhh, remember bullet point #1 back up there? Where you wrote that economists agree a win-win situation almost never happens? Maybe his reading doesn’t even extend to the very editorial he’s writing.
Overall grade: D, maybe C-minus for a good essay topic, but the execution needs a lot of work. To do this right you need to analyze the actual return on a stadium investment in tax revenues, the emotional value of an NFL team to a community, any measurable impact on business activity as a result of the presence of sports teams (though those economists back in the first paragraph have it covered for you: there is none), what other options the team has to move, and so on. Instead, Dunn’s analysis comes down to: Economists say stadiums don’t pay off, but I really like football, and there’s tourism tax money just sitting right there, so somebody just offer something already, I can’t take this uncertainty! Sounds like somebody needs another beer.