J.C. Bradbury, the Kennesaw State University sports economist who was appointed to the Cobb County Development Authority in 2019, has written several studies of the Atlanta Braves stadium that have been noted here, including one on how commercial property values around the stadium went down relative to nearby areas, one on how sales-tax receipts for Cobb County went up less after the stadium opened than did sales-tax receipts in neighboring counties, and one on how property values overall in Cobb County did not rise relative to neighboring counties following the stadium’s opening. Now, for the fifth anniversary of the stadium’s opening, Bradbury has done a comprehensive study of the development history of the Braves stadium and its costs and benefits, and let’s cut to the big takeaway:
The fiscal benefits of Cobb funding Truist Park fall well short of its cost to taxpayers, who are left to fund an annual revenue shortfall of nearly $15 million, which translates to approximately $50 per Cobb household per year.
“Annual revenue shortfall” is an economisty way of saying “net losses.” So Bradbury’s conclusion, after looking at the $300-million-plus that taxpayers put into the stadium project, is that even after all the supposed economic benefits of having a new stadium like Braves fans pouring into their county to spend money at ballgames and at the neighboring ballpark village of stores and restaurants, Cobb residents are still on the hook for $15 million a year (actually $14.62 million, to be precise) that they’re not getting back.
How much is $14.62 million a year total? There are a bunch of ways to calculate present value of a future series of annual costs, but let’s go with one of the more traditional ones, which is to plug that number into a present value calculator with a 5% discount rate. (The discount rate isn’t quite the same as the rate of inflation; rather, it’s meant to represent how much money you could get by investing the same money in something else. Choosing 5% is a bit arbitrary, but fairly standard.) The public’s Braves stadium costs are set to continue for a total of 30 years, so plug that in and we get a final bill for Cobb residents of: $224.75 million.
That would imply that Cobb taxpayers are getting back in new taxes less than one-third of the money they put into the Braves stadium. If we look at it on an annual basis — $24.86 million in costs per year, $14.62 million of that not returned by new taxes — it looks marginally better, more like 60% of the public costs that just disappear and never come back. But either way, the only possible conclusion is that the Braves’ new stadium is a massive money pit for Cobb County residents, just like pretty much all other sports subsidies. As Bradbury notes in his conclusion, “While I have often been painted as a ‘naysayer’ for my criticism of hopeful projections of economic impacts, my skepticism appears to have been warranted.”
The paper is long and well worth reading for its other deep dives into the numbers: In one section, Bradbury analyzes the small increase in Cobb County sales tax revenue that accompanied the stadium’s opening, and notes that it’s about one-third less than the total sales taxes collected at that ballpark village, The Battery, meaning that a large chunk of Battery spending must be getting diverted from elsewhere in the county. But for now, I’ll leave you with the conclusion of his conclusion, which sums up his findings nicely:
Despite being ideally located and developed as part of a comprehensive mixed-use project, Truist Park is not an exception to the dismal economics of stadiums: this stadium has not been different from past publicly-subsidized stadiums that have failed to generate promised economic returns. Vociferous claims that the stadium would be a home run are like the call of an overly-enthusiastic announcer who yells in excitement at the crack of the bat; however, when it turns out to be just another routine pop-fly we expect even the most home-biased commentator to call it as an out and not lie about the ball going over the fence. It is time to admit that the Braves have not been a home run for Cobb.
Or, to put it even more pithily: Friends don’t let friends sink tax money into building sports stadiums. Not if they ever want to see it again, anyway.
From a comedy perspective, the paper is well worth reading because it preserves econ profs’ 1.000 batting average in ignoring or minimizing jobs gains when analyzing the economic impact of sports stadiums.
1. Economists tend not to focus on jobs as a measure of economic development, because employment isn’t a good metric for assessing economic effects.
2. I’m not aware of any credible economic study that finds strong job gains from stadiums, though many find null and negative effects (see this survey: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4022547 ). Please share if you know of some, because I’d be happy to learn of any positive jobs findings that I am not aware of.
3. I explicitly discuss the ridiculous jobs projections in commissioned studies (which don’t even match) in the report.
1) I will assume that either “employment isn’t a good metric for assessing economic effects” is a joke, or that those are the words of an econ prof.
2) There is at least one credible economic study which finds strong job gains from stadiums, and it is cited in this report: Plus-3,100 jobs from the Battery development, according to CEDR. (Or does that not count, since it came from the real world?)
3) The term “minimize” covers writing a hundred-plus page study, mentioning jobs a handful of times, then editorializing that something is “ridiculous” because it doesn’t match the author’s belief system.
Actually there are two commissioned studies that present jobs numbers, both of which I discuss in great detail in the report. I explain why both estimates (which differ considerably) are not credible, explicitly. To suggest that I do not justify why I find them non-credible is not arguing in good faith.
And by real world, do you mean it came from a canned software program or unpresented regression estimates with no explanation of where it came from? Because that’s where the CEDR number comes from, not from any observable public employment numbers.
I agree, your assertion that there have been significant job gains from the stadium does not align with my “belief system.” My belief that stadiums are not strong drivers of economic growth is informed by more than 100 studies conducted over the past four decades, as well as my own research. In might deep dive into the Truist Park development, I have need nothing that would change my mind. If you would like to present some counter evidence that might change my mind, by all means please do so.
I will let that be the last word. If you decide to succinctly explain why you think jobs and economic prosperity are not related, hmu.
I never said jobs and economic prosperity are not related. I said that economists tend not to focus on jobs to measure economic development, which is true. I say that as an economist who studies economic development. Jobs are quite different from each and are not equal. If a community gains many bad jobs while losing fewer better-quality jobs, it’s not necessarily a win. Defining employment can also be difficult given outside forces that affect full-time and part-time status. For example, the Obamacare mandate dramatically changed workforce composition in many sectors. Thus, economists tend to focus on other measures like income, spending, and growth, because these metrics are richer in information and are highly correlated with employment.
And, as I stated, economists have studied the impact of stadiums and teams on jobs, and there is no evidence of strong positive impacts on employment.
“If a community gains many bad jobs while losing fewer better-quality jobs, it’s not necessarily a win.”
How’s that gonna happen in a free market, bud?
(points Ben in the direction of the last 40 years of everything)
Thank you for this excellent work Prof. Bradbury. I have not finished reading the entire thing yet, but it is very interesting.
Following the money in very important. As Tim Lee most certainly showed when he left the board of Commissioners to go work for the Braves… The economic impact on Mr. Lee was, I’m sure, quite positive.
Hi John,
Thank you for your kind compliment; however, do wish to correct you on one thing. The late Tim Lee did not ever work for the Atlanta Braves. After being voted out of office he moved to Habersham County to run its economic development office.
I appreciate this correction.
Are you a local? Have you seen the impact on residential and commercial development in this area? For an easy 10-15 mile radius, the area has transformed and appeal has significantly grown. And this is independent from the RE growth nationally. Also, did you expect a full return and profit in just five years? What similar operation has done it that quickly? Fulton County didn’t want to work with the team, Turner Field was gorgeous and miserable to get to, park and had nothing around it. The benefits from this move to the team and ultimately to the area, come from many sources, not just the spreadsheet over the first five years.
Tim Lee is worthless. He was a corrupt politician and got kicked out rightly so.