The Athletic, aka the non-union (for now) sports website that the New York Times replaced its sports department with, ran an article yesterday about MLS and its desire for new stadiums that sits firmly in the pantheon of “the business of sports business writing is business” reporting: The first words are “Chicago Fire owner Joe Mansueto’s eye for Chicago real estate,” and it just gets more investment-bro-y from there. The ostensible topic is how the Fire and NYC F.C. and the New England Revolution are all working on new stadiums, and how MLS needs them to “wake up” those “critical markets” and “make those teams truly matter in those cities.”
If this means anything, it presumably means getting more people to go to MLS games in those cities. The Revolution and Fire were 7th and 8th in MLS attendance last year — to the extent that official MLS attendance figures mean anything — while NYC F.C. was in 14th. Those figures, all in the 21,000-24,000 per game range, pale in comparison to Atlanta United (41,000 per game) or the Seattle Sounders (31,000), but then those teams play in NFL stadiums, so they have the capacity to draw more. And in fact the new Fire stadium would only hold 22,000 and the Revolution stadium 24,000, both less than the teams claim to be drawing now, so it’s going to be tough to see much increase in announced attendance, though perhaps fewer fans will show up dressed as empty seats.
Either way, the fact that a soccer reporter is asserting that “activating the country’s biggest markets is critical for [MLS] building relevance and establishing a superior television audience” is an indication that MLS needs big markets more than the big markets need MLS, so if new soccer-only stadiums in those markets are truly what will make the league a success, its owners can reasonably be expected to find the capital to build them themselves. Both NYC F.C. and the Fire (Boston is still in the planning stages) are covering construction costs, but both are also being built on land that is at least partly exempt from property tax, amounting to subsidies of around $538 million in New York and $700 million (not all of it for the stadium) in Chicago, plus perhaps another $200 million in infrastructure costs for New York. Could those cities have cut better deals, knowing that the league needed to get them done in order to build relevance and establish a superior television audience? We’ll never know — though early indications in the Revolution’s stadium plans show that holding firm and refusing to give up the store is an option, when savvy city negotiators recognize their leverage.

